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IMPROPER DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
IN CHILD CUSTODY CASES: FINALLY OVERTURNED
Dale Margolin Cecka *
"The appellate courts of this Commonwealth are not unlit rooms
where attorneys may wander blindly about, hoping to stumble upon
a reversible error."
These words of Judge Humphreys, denying a 2016 child custody
appeal, are cogent.2 Yet four months later, in another appeal,
Judge Humphreys joined a unanimous decision overturning a com-
mon provision in a custody order.3 In Bonhotel v. Watts, the Court
of Appeals of Virginia held that judges cannot delegate judicial de-
cision making power in child custody cases to outside profession-
als. 4 This sounds obvious, but such delegation is actually ordered
* Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Jeanette Family Law Clinic, University
of Richmond School of Law, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2004, Columbia Law School; B.A.,
1999, Stanford University. The author would like to thank Mark Branca and Jenni Lyman
for their invaluable research assistance. The author has practiced domestic relations and
child welfare law for over fourteen years in trial courts in Virginia and New York. Upon
graduation, Professor Cecka was selected as a Skadden Fellow at the Legal Aid Society,
representing children in foster care in all five boroughs of New York City, and later, as a
Teaching Fellow and the Director of the Child Advocacy Clinic at St. John's School of Law
which serves Queens and Long Island. In 2008, Professor Cecka was appointed by the Uni-
versity of Richmond School of Law to create and launch the Family Law Clinic, which was
the first, and still only, pro bono service for litigants in central Virginia on contested domes-
tic relations matters. Under Professor Cecka's supervision, third-year law students try
cases in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts and the Circuit Courts of Richmond,
Henrico, Chesterfield, Petersburg, and Hanover. Professor Cecka is also Of Counsel in do-
mestic relations matters to the law firm Winslow and McCurry in Chesterfield, Virginia,
and has made appearances in Clarke and York Counties in that capacity.
1. Coe v. Coe, 66 Va. App. 457, 470, 788 S.E.2d 261, 267 (2016) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
2. Id. at 463, 470, 788 S.E.2d at 264, 267-68. Trial court decisions rarely get over-
turned at the appellate level, and appeals on the merits of custody cases rarely even reach
the court of appeals. See infra Part II.
3. Bonhotel v. Watts, No. 0040-16-3, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 327, at *8 (Ct. App. Dec. 6,
2016) (unpublished decision).
4. Id. at *8-9.
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all the time. In final orders, Virginia's trial court judges frequently
give discretion to guardians ad litem ("GALs"), as well as thera-
peutic counselors, to determine issues such as the frequency,
length, and substance of parent-child visitation.6
This practice, whereby the best interests of the child are decided
outside of a courtroom, should have been dispensed with long ago.
The Virginia Code makes this clear.6 Delegation orders also run
afoul of the United States Constitution. Delegation violates the
fundamental right to parent and can violate an individual's physi-
cal liberty when that individual is held in contempt of court orders
made by a non-judicial decision maker. Other states have banned
the practice for years.7 Delegation is simply a cultural relic of the
Virginia trial courts that has never had any legal basis.
Part I of the article describes the Bonhotel and Reilly v. Reilly
decisions and defines delegation of judicial authority in child cus-
tody matters. Part II of the article explains why Virginia trial court
judges have ordered delegation for decades despite the lack of case
law actually upholding the practice. Part III explores why delega-
tion is such a common part of custody orders given the extraordi-
narily discretionary nature of custody matters and the statutory
use of GALs. Part IV of the article describes the problems with del-
egation from both legal and non-legal perspectives. Part V part of
the article details the leading decisions in other states, some dec-
ades old, that have overturned delegation and discusses the reper-
cussions of these decisions. Finally, the article concludes by sug-
gesting that, given the rarity of custody cases reaching the
appellate level in Virginia, the trial courts could very easily con-
tinue issuing delegation orders. However, it is up to Virginia law-
yers, including GALs, to extinguish the practice of delegation in
the wake of Bonhotel and Reilly.
5. Based on the author's experience. In one extreme example, the author had a case
where a mother's visitation schedule was essentially determined not by the GAL but by the
administrative assistant to the GAL. See case on file with author.
6. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Repl. Vol. 2016 & Supp. 2017) (highlighting that the
court should consider the factors pertaining to a child's best interests).
7. See infra Part V.
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I. BONHOTEL, REILLY, AND OTHER EXAMPLES OF DELEGATION OF
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
A. Bonhotel
In Bonhotel v. Watts, the Circuit Court for the City of Roanoke
issued a common type of provision in a final custody order with
regard to a child's therapeutic counselor.8 The circuit court or-
dered, in part, "[t]he child shall continue in counseling with [the
counselor] until he releases her or until he recommends some other
course. The parents shall fully cooperate with the child's counselor
and shall follow his or her recommendations." 9
In an unusual move, 10 the father appealed this ambiguous as-
pect of the order, arguing that the trial court erred in delegating to
the child's counselor "unlimited, unfettered discretion over any and
all parenting decisions to which both parents have to adhere or be
subject to the contempt power of the court."" The court of appeals
agreed, making a profound statement about the father's constitu-
tional rights.12 In sum, the overly broad clause hurts the parents'
Due Process rights by infringing upon the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.13 The court of appeals said the trial
court's order was an improper delegation of the court's "unique au-
thority"14 and reversed and remanded to the circuit court to ad-
dress the constitutional "overbreadth."15
The reversal of the trial court was surprising because the rever-
sal rate for the Court of Appeals of Virginia is only thirteen per-
cent.16 In addition, traditionally, the United States Constitution is
8. 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 327, at *7.
9. Id. (second alteration in original).
10. See infra Part II (explaining the rarity of appellate court appeals in custody mat-
ters).
11. Bonhotel, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 327, at *8.
12. Id. at *9-10 ("The problem with the circuit court's language is its lack of limita-
tion. . . When a court fails to draw limits on the circumstances under which a parent must
follow a third party's recommendations, those recommendations become orders them-
selves .... The overly-broad language of Paragraph 11 impinges upon parenting decisions
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The unlimited require-
ment that the parents follow the counselor's recommendations affects not only father, but
mother as well (although she is the appellee here).").
13. Id. at*10.
14. Id. at *9.
15. Id. at *8.
16. L. Steven Emmert, A Quick Read on Appellate Statistics, VA. APP. NEWS &
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rarely used in domestic relations and custody cases in the states,
even at the appellate level.17
But most importantly, the reversal in Bonhotel was notable be-
cause the Roanoke judge's order was actually quite standard for
Virginia custody cases. The order is ambiguous-it is not clear here
what the parents would have to do to comply with the counselor,
nor is it clear how long the child will continue counseling-but this
is completely normal in custody matters.18 First, there is always
some level of uncertainty in custody decisions because they can be
modified until a child turns eighteen. 19 Res judicata does not exist
in child custody cases.20 Second, it is par for the course in a custody
decision for a judge to issue an order that requires at least one
party, or non-party, to take post-decree discretionary actions.21 In
other words, the remedies in custody matters are not simply pay-
ment of money or cessation of action. Custody orders frequently
require future decision-making on the part of at least one player. 22




Xcs (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).
17. See Linda D. Elrod, The Federalization of Family Law, 36 HuMAN RIGHTS
MAG. No. (2009), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/humanrights-magazine-ho
me/humanjrights -vol36_2009/summer2009/the-federalizationlofifamilylaw.html ("His-
torically, family law has been a matter of state law. State legislatures define what consti-
tutes a family and enact the laws that regulate marriage, parentage, adoption, child welfare,
divorce, family support obligations, and property rights.").
18. Bonhotel, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 327, at *8 (calling the custody order "overly broad").
These custody orders are common in the author's experience.
19. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108 (Repl. Vol. 2016 & Supp. 2017) (explaining that custody
decrees may be modified); see also id. § 20-146.1 (Repl. Vol. 2016) (defining "child" under
Virginia child custody laws as someone who is not yet eighteen). Custody decrees may apply
to children over eighteen in limited circumstances under Virginia Code section 20-124.2. Id.
§ 20-107.2 (Repl. Vol. 2016 & Supp. 2017); id. § 20-124.2 (Supp. 2017).
20. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 192-94 (1962) (holding that, in light of Vir-
ginia's strong policy of protecting the best interests of the child, the courts would not apply
res judicata to custody agreements).
21. See, e.g., Heffron v. Heffron, No. CJ11-89 & 95, 2013 Va. Cir. LEXIS 8, at *6 (Cir.
Ct. Feb. 20, 2013) (Roanoke County) (unpublished decision) (describing a custody order in
which parents had to cooperate with the post-decree decisions of the clinician offering coun-
seling to their son); Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 50 Va. Cir, 604, 605 (1998) (Fairfax County)
(giving the mother discretion over the father's visitation rights after the order was issued).
These orders are common in the author's experience.
22. These custody orders are common in the author's experience.
23. This observation is based on the author's own experience and from interviews with




A few days after Bonhotel, in Reilly v. Reilly, a mother made a
similar claim regarding an improper delegation of judicial author-
ity in a custody order.24 The circuit court order stated, the "Mother
shall enjoy Supervised Visitation . . . . Supervision can be altered
IN WRITING by the Guardian ad Litem based upon [the] Mother's
strict compliance with the conditions and other provisions set forth
in this Order." 25
The mother argued that the circuit court "gave the GAL 'sole
discretion over determining visitation' between [the] mother and
the children." 26 The court of appeals agreed with the mother and
said that the plain language of the order gave the GAL "authority
to alter supervision without a ruling from or any hearing in the
circuit court." 2 7 Much like Bonhotel, the language in the order is
forceful. It was erroneous "for the circuit court to approve such lan-
guage allowing a third party, even a guardian ad litem, total dis-
cretion to decide [the] mother's visitation without providing judi-
cial review because it is inconsistent with the language and
purpose of Code § 20-124.2."28
The court of appeals was specifically concerned with the abroga-
tion of the circuit court's statutory duty, quoting the Supreme
Court of Virginia:
A court of equity cannot abdicate its authority or powers, nor confide
nor surrender absolutely to anyone the performance of any of its judi-
cial functions. It may rightfully avail itself of the eyes and arms of its
assistants . . . but in it resides the authority, and to it solely belongs
the responsibility, to adjudicate them.29
In fact, the court of appeals was so concerned with the trial
court's delegation of statutory authority that it bothered to write
this section at all.3 0 As the court notes, it did not have to rule on
24. No. 1369-15-2, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 343, at *15-16 (Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2016) (un-
published decision).
25. Id. at *16.
26. Id. at *15.
27. Id. at *16-17.
28. Id.
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the delegation issue: "Although our decision to remand for a de
novo trial necessitates the reversal of the circuit court's final order
(and thus its custody and visitation [determination]), we address
the assignment of error regarding ... visitation because of the like-
lihood that the issue will arise again. . . ."31
Clearly, the court wanted to send a message to trial courts across
Virginia.
C. Other Examples of Delegation
1. Delegation to GAL
The trial court orders in Bonhotel and Reilly are not unusual.
The use of GALs to make post-decretal custody decisions is the
most common uge.3 2 Some examples from the author's own practice
include: (1) "visitation to Mother,... as agreed by Paternal Grand-
mother and . . . GAL;"3 3 (2) "visitation to [Aunt] . . . from Friday
evening to Saturday afternoon at times governed by the GAL;" 3 4 (3)
"Christmas shall be split as decided by the GAL;"35 (4) "all contact
with father is to be supervised by Paternal Grandmother, Paternal
Aunt or any other agreed upon adult by [the Paternal Gandmother]
and the GAL;"3 6 and (5) "the court has suggested that [the paternal
grandmother] does not have to supervise [the mother's] visits if an-
other supervisor can be agreed upon by the [Paternal Grand-
mother], [the mother], and [the] GAL." 3 7
Often, the orders are extremely vague in what kind of decisions
and how decisions are to be made.
2. Delegation to Therapeutic Counselors
In addition to GALs, judges often order therapeutic counselors
to make post-decretal decisions. Sometimes the "counselor" in the
court order is not even a real person, but a provider to be identified
31. Id. at *15 n.6.
32. In the author's experience, this is the most common use of GALs in custody orders.
33. Order on file with author (capitalization in original removed for clarity).
34. Order on file with author (capitalization in original removed for clarity).
35. Order on file with author (capitalization in original removed for clarity).
36. Order on file with author (capitalization in original removed for clarity).
37. Order on file with author (capitalization in original removed for clarity).
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some time in the future. For example, orders the author has seen
have said, "The court orders mental health evaluation be per-
formed on the parents either through Henrico Mental Health or a
private provider, and follow all recommendations;"38 and "Until the
Mother begins mental health counseling and complied with the
recommendations the court will decline any motions to amend vis-
itation." 39
Even when a specific counselor is identified in a court order, that
person rarely appears in court, at least at the juvenile and domes-
tic relations ("JDR") level.40 Occasionally, counselors do submit re-
ports prior to final custody hearings. The parties generally agree
to stipulate to the report's authenticity, because they know that
the judge expects any hearsay "information" available to come in
to the record.41 However, this means the report comes in to evi-
dence without any identification and, more importantly, without
direct or cross examination.
Moreover, as with GALs, future duties of the counselor are often
vague, but nonetheless binding. For example, a case the author
worked on said, "Any increases in the visitation shall be made in
consultation with the child's counselor, and shall be confirmed in
writing between the parties. No amendments that are therapeuti-
cally recommended shall be denied by either parent."42
38. Order on file with author (italicized portion handwritten by the judge after the
printed order was made).
39. Order on file with author (capitalization in original removed for clarity). This is
particularly troubling because it suggests the judge was trying to forbid someone from even
filing a petition. But every person with a legitimate interest (in the best interests of the
child) can file a custody petition and a subsequent motion to amend. See VA. CODE ANN. §
20-124.2(B) (Supp. 2017); id. §§ 20-108, -124.1 (Repl. Vol. 2016 & Supp. 2017); see also Welch
v. Wise Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 84 Va. Cir. 245, 247 (2012) (Wise County).
40. In most cases, having a counselor appear in court costs a tremendous amount of
money, and based on the author's experience, JDR judges often do not require it. See, e.g.,
Giambanco v. Giambanco, Nos. 1269-00-2 and 2004-00-2, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 335, at *9
(Ct. App. June 12, 2001) (explaining that a mother was granted $3788.75 for expert witness
costs).
41. See Raven C. Lidman & Betsy R. Hollingsworth, The Guardian Ad Litem in Child
Custody Cases: The Contours of Our Judicial System Stretched Beyond Recognition, 6 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 255, 274 (1998) (describing that expert reports are not submitted to the rec-
ord unless the parties stipulate to their admissibility). Based on the author's experience,
judges often expect this information to be in the record because they do not trust the parties
to provide enough information. See id. at 288 (describing judges' mistrust of parents in cus-
tody cases).
42. Order on file with author.
1872017]
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In this example, the parents were clearly ordered to follow the
counselor's recommendations, yet the court had never even heard
from the counselor herself.43
3. Post-Decretal Mutual Agreement by Parties-Always
Permissible
To be clear, the actual parties to a custody case (mother, father,
and third party who has standing to petition for visitation or cus-
tody)4 4 can mutually agree to deviate from a final court order on
visitation and other terms.45 Judges make this statement in open
court and often explicitly include it in orders.46 In other words, par-
ties are free to make mutual post-decretal decisions about the best
interest of their children, because parents have a fundamental
right to parent.47
But non-parental, non-interested third parties, such as GALs
and counselors, do not have any such rights. 48 Moreover, non-par-
ties are not under the jurisdiction of the court, as are parents.49 A
GAL or counselor cannot be "show caused" for failing to comply
with part of a court order.50 In the author's experience, the worst
that can happen when a GAL or counselor fails to comply is that
the parties can file a motion to modify the order, appear in court,
and testify that the third party failed to do her duty. The court can
43. Order on file with author.
44. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (Repl. Vol. 2016 & Supp. 2017).
45. See, e.g., Bonhotel v. Watts, No. 0040-16-3, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 327, at *2 (Ct.
App. Dec. 6, 2016) (unpublished decision) (discussing how the parents' custody order from
the court "did not address visitation" so the parties managed visitation by mutual agree-
ment); Mattingly v. McCrystal, No. 2556-04-4, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 75, at *3, *8-11 (Ct.
App. Feb. 28, 2006) (unpublished decision) (explaining that parents can change a pre-exist-
ing custody agreement by entering their private agreement into the record).
46. The author has heard this expression on numerous occasions and has seen it in
custody orders.
47. See Bonhotel, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 327, at *8-10 (finding that parents have a pro-
tected right to parent and a court cannot force them to follow the orders of a third party);
see also discussion of parents' fundamental right to parent infra Part IV.
48. See infra Part IV.A (discussing how parents have fundamental right to parent).
49. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
50. Compare id. § 16.1-278.16 (Repl. Vol. 2015) (explaining that a party can be show
caused for failing to comply with a court order), with id. § 16.1-266 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum.
Supp. 2017) (explaining that the GAL represents the best interest of the child and thus is
not a party to the suit).
188 [Vol. 52:181
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take the GAL's failure into consideration when making further rul-
ings, but the court cannot directly sanction the third party.5 1
II. RARITY OF CUSTODY APPEALS
A. Numbers
As noted above, delegation orders are extremely prevalent in
Virginia trial courts. But according to the definitive language of
Bonhotel and Reilly, many of these orders have never been lawful
because they improperly delegate judicial authority.52 How can
these orders have continued unfettered for so long? The answer is
simple. Less than 0.004% of custody matters get appellate review
in Virginia. 53
There are 124 JDR courts in Virginia. 54 In 2016, these courts
heard 287,024 matters of custody and visitation.55 There are 120
circuit courts in Virginia.56 Circuit courts hear all custody petitions
filed concurrently with divorces.57 Circuit courts also hear appeals
51. Fleming v. Asbill, 42 F.3d 886, 888-89 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that even if the GAL
lied to the judge in open court, she was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity as a GAL); Cok
v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989) (declaring that the GAL "shared in the family
court judge's absolute immunity"); Bullock v. Huster, 554 N.W.2d 47, 49 (Mich. Ct. App.
1996) (holding that the state legislature included GALs within the immunity shield if their
acts fell within the scope of their authority); Bird v. Weinstock, 864 S.W.2d 376, 385-86 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing absolute quasi-judicial immunity for GALs).
52. Reilly v. Reilly, No. 1369-15-2, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 343, at *16-17, *19 (Ct. App.
Dec. 13, 2016) (unpublished decision); Bonhotel v. Watts, No. 0040-16-3, 2016 Va. App.
LEXIS 327, at *8-9 (Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2016) (unpublished decision).
53. The author conservatively estimates that 12 out of every 300,000 appeals are cus-
tody matters. Based on author's calculations as described below.
54. Individual Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Homepages, VA.'S JUD.
SYs., http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/jdr.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).
55. VA.'S JUD. SYS., COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA CASELOAD STATISTICS OF THE J&DR
DISTRICT COURTS (2016) [hereinafter VIRGINIA JDR CASELOAD STATISTICS], http://www.
courts.state.va.us/courtadminlaoc/judpln/csilstats/jdr/ei012016.pdf.
56. VA.'S JUD. SYS., THE CIRCUIT COURT (2011), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/
circuit/circuitinfo.pdf.
57. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-96 (Repl. Vol. 2016); id. § 20-107.2 (Repl. Vol. 2016 & Supp.
2017).
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de novo from JDR courts on custody matters.58 In 2013,59 all of Vir-
ginia's circuit courts heard 7045 appeals from JDR courts60 and
34,002 divorces. 61
So, conservatively, circuit and JDR courts in Virginia hear
nearly 300,000 custody and visitation cases a year at the trial
level.6 2 Of that 300,000, in 2016, only twelve custody cases reached
the court of appeals. 63
B. Systemic Reasons for the Lack of Appeals
There are a number of systemic reasons for the lack of appellate
cases in the area of custody. Historically, domestic relations, par-
ticularly custody, is not a rich area of appellate law. Prior to the
mid-twentieth century, divorce was rare and fault-based. 64 The
spouse who did not cause the divorce would usually be awarded
everything: the children, property, and alimony.65 The appellate
courts had little need to address nuances regarding the placement
of children or parenting abilities under this approach, which fo-
cused on the cause of the divorce and not the repercussions, espe-
cially for the children.66
58. Id. § 16.1-296 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2017).
59. According to the Virginia Supreme Court's administrator, the most recent caseload
report available where JDR appeals and divorces are differentiated is from 2013. See Case-
load Statistical Information, VA.'S JUD. SYS., http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadm
inlaoc/judpln/csilhome.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).
60. VA.'S JUD. SYs., VIRGINIA CIRCUIT COURT CASELOAD REPORTING SYSTEM (2013)
[hereinafter VIRGINIA CIRCUIT COURT 2013 CASELOAD STATISTICS], http://www.courts.state.
va.us/courtadmin/aoc/judpn/csilstats/circuit/crlannual/crOl12013.pdf This number is
larger than the number of custody appeals alone because JDR appeals include child and
spousal support cases as well. See Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court, VA.'S JUD.
SYS., http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/jdr/home.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).
61. The number of divorces is far greater than the number of JDR cases because not all
divorces involve custody disputes.
62. See VIRGINIA JDR CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 55; VIRGINIA CIRCUIT COURT
2013 CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 60.
63. Using the Supreme Court of Virginia's data, the author calculated that 250 domes-
tic relations cases made it to the appellate level. Additionally, the author read through every
single published and unpublished domestic relations appeal. See Opinions, VA.'S JUD. SYS.,
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/home.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2017). The other
domestic relations cases heard by the court of appeals involved equitable distribution,
grounds for divorce, child support, and/or spousal support.
64. Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 41, at 288.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 288-89.
[Vol. 52:181190
CHILD CUSTODY
In Virginia, there is an even stronger reason for the lack of ap-
pellate review in the twenty-first century. Custody litigants are en-
titled to two trials for every custody matter. This is because, shock-
ingly, JDR courts are not courts of record.67 This means that the
facts put forth at a JDR custody trial do not legally exist. The trial
takes place entirely anew, based on the same original petition, a
second time in circuit court. This is called de novo appeal, and
every custody litigant is entitled to one as long as he files a simple
notice of appeal to the circuit court within ten days of the JDR
trial.68 This proceeding is not an appeal on a matter of law; it is a
do-over of the trial.
However, despite being an appeal of right, in reality relatively
few people appeal custody matters de novo, 69 and, therefore, even
fewer appeal to the court of appeals. There are a number of reasons
for this. JDR litigants are often low income 70 and/or pro se.7 1 Pro
se parties may not know they have an appeal of right or they do
not have the time or ability to exercise this right (for example, be-
cause they cannot take off from work for more court appear-
ances). 72 Even parties who have attorneys and can afford another
67. Statutes governing JDR courts are found under Title 16.1, "courts not of record."
See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-226 to -361 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2017).
68. See id. § 16.1-296 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2017) ("From any final order or
judgment of the juvenile court affecting the rights or interests of any person coming within
its jurisdiction, an appeal may be taken to the circuit court within 10 days from the entry of
a final judgment, order or conviction and shall be heard de novo.").
69. As noted earlier, there were 287,024 matters of custody and visitation heard in JDR
courts and about 7000 get appealed per year. See supra Part II.A.
70. See, e.g., Joy S. Rosenthal, An Argument for Joint Custody as an Option for All
Family Court Mediation Program Participants, 11 N.Y.C.L. REV. 127, 132-33 (2007) (citing
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE FOR JUSTICE INITIATIVES, SELF-REPRESENTED
LITIGANTS IN THE NEW YORK CITY FAMILY COURT AND NEW YORK CITY HOUSING COURT 3-
4 (2005)) ("It is well documented that most people who appear in New York City's Family
Courts are poor people of color. According to the New York State Unified Court System's
Office of the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge for Justice Initiatives (DCAJ-JI), 84% of
self-represented litigants in New York Family and Housing Courts are people of color, and
83% reported a household income of under $30,000 and 57% reported household income of
under $20,000."); Warren R. McGraw, Family Court System Awarded $1.3 Million Federal
Grant to Help Families, W. VA. LAW., Oct. 2001, at 8 (describing that in West Virginia in
2001, some estimate that 90% to 95% of family law litigants fell below the poverty level).
71. See Rosenthal, supra note 70, at 132-33; see also Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se
Litigant's Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance,
40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 36 (2002) (footnotes omitted) ("The surge in pro se litigation, particu-
larly in the family courts of every common law country, is reported in official reports and
anecdotally by judges and court managers and in systematic studies."); Hon. Gerald W.
Hardcastle, Adversarialism and the Family Court: A Family Court Judge's Perspective, 9
U.C. DAVIS J. JUv. L. & POL'Y 57, 121 & n.152 (2005) ("The family court has invited the pro
se litigant. The pro se litigant has accepted the invitation in droves.").
72. Based on the author's experience and interviews with pro se litigants, these are
2017] 191
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trial rarely appeal because the likelihood of winning is small com-
pared to the costs to the client.73 If the parties lose again in circuit
court, the chances of them having the money and energy to appeal
are even slimmer.
The nuances of custodial law rarely come up in the JDR courts
of Virginia,74 and most custody matters originate in JDR courts.75
Parties make arguments based on only one statute-best interests
of the child-which governs custody.76 Judges, if they make oral or
written findings, base them on the ten factors in the statute.77
If a JDR court order is appealed to a circuit court, the circuit
court hears the case de novo, but if an argument was unsuccessful
in the JDR court, the party may not have success bringing it up
again.78 When a circuit court order is appealed to the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia, the court of appeals considers the circuit court's
order, but does not consider any prior JDR court orders or any of
the arguments that were made in the JDR court.79
C. What This Means in Terms of Delegation of Judicial Authority
Every day, in thousands of cases, JDR courts make all kinds of
rulings that are never reviewed at any level. Cultural practices can
develop and continue in JDR courts for decades, even if they are
not lawful. This provides one explanation for why delegation orders
are so common yet the lawfulness of delegation orders had never
been heard by the court of appeals before 2016.
The delegation issue did not reach the court of appeals until
2016 for another very specific and important reason: most delega-
tion orders mandate a GAL to take affirmation action. GALs can
common reasons for failing to appeal.
73. See Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 41, at 289-90 (noting that widespread
discretion at the trial level has "nearly exempted" custodial matters from appellate review).
Additionally, based on the author's own experience and interviews with other lawyers, it is
unlikely to win an appeal.
74. Based on the author's experience.
75. Compare VIRGINIA JDR CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 55, with VIRGINIA
CIRCUIT COURT 2013 CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 60.
76. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Repl. Vol. 2016 & Supp. 2017).
77. See id. In the author's experience, most judges only issue orders and not findings.
Furthermore, JDR court judges never issue opinions because JDR courts are "courts not of
record." See id. §§ 16.1-226 to -361 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2017).
78. See id. § 16.1-296(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2017).
79. See id. § 16.1-297 (Repl. Vol. 2015) (establishing that the circuit court opinion shall
"become the judgment of the juvenile court").
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appeal cases,80 but GALs also rely on their courts for appoint-
ment.81 It is not in the GAL's interest to object to what a judge has
ordered them to do because those judges determine how much work
a GAL receives.8 2 This is not to lay blame on GALs for failing to
bring appeals on delegation orders; it is simply reality. Judges do
not want to be overturned and are less likely to appoint a GAL who
appeals their orders. Judges also rely heavily on GALs for guid-
ance,83 and want to appoint GALs that will do thorough investiga-
tions and comply with orders to make post-decretal decisions.
III. WHY DELEGATION IS A COMMON PRACTICE IN CUSTODY CASES
A. Nature of JDR Courts
JDR courts84 have a stigma throughout the country as the "step-
children" of the legal system. 5 In Virginia, they are at the district
court level and are often a first appointment for a judge before mov-
ing up to circuit court.8 6 JDR courts are located in separate build-
ings in Virginia, and many use open docket calls (as opposed to
time-certain trials) which can create an atmosphere of chaos.8 7
JDR courtrooms are informal; forms are used instead of formal
80. OFFICE OF THE EXEC. SEC'Y, SUPREME COURT OF VA., ADVOCACY IN MOTION 36
(2011), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadminlaoc/cip/programs/gal/children/advocacy-i
n_motion.pdf.
81. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
83. See Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 41, at 276.
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (Cum. Supp. 2017) (establishing the jurisdiction of JDR
courts to hear dependency, delinquency, custody, paternity, child in need of services, person
in need of services, and other juvenile matters). In the author's experience, other states call
these courts "Family Court" or "Juvenile Court."
85. Catherine J. Ross, The Failure of Fragmentation: The Promise of a System of Uni-
fied Family Courts, 32 FAM. L.Q. 3, 3 (1998); see also Michel Marriott, Family Court Is
Struggling with Caseload, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 1987), http://www.nytimes.
com/1987/11/15/nyregion/family-court-is-struggling-with-caseload-experts-say.
86. For instance, Judge Robbins of the Chesterfield County Circuit Court began as a
JDR court judge. Mark Bowes, Chesterfield Bar Endorses 11 to Succeed 2 County Judges,
RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.richmond.com/news/chesterfield-bar-en
dorses-to-succeed-county-judges/article_8a2e6O5l-d48d-592d-a007-5fd2e3d71298.html.
87. Ross, supra note 85 ("Family courts in most states conjure up overcrowded facilities
lacking the veneer of civility, let alone majesty, whose chaotic site itself speaks volumes to
the frequently downtrodden and almost always traumatized families that pass through
them."). In the author's experience, Henrico JDR courts use open docket call as opposed to
time-certain trials in Henrico Circuit Court.
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pleadings,88 and in some venues, litigants stand around the judge
instead of at counsel table.89 Courts frequently use non-legal pro-
fessionals such as social workers and Court Appointed Special Ad-
vocates90 to "evaluate" families and children and provide infor-
mation to the court.91 Additionally, many civil matters in JDR
courts are quasi-criminal, but are adjudicated using civil proce-
dures.92 Scholars have written extensively about these issues.93
B. Discretionary Nature of Custody Matters
"[J]udicial decision-making in [private child custody] cases is
viewed as extremely difficult."94 Disputes between parties often
last for years before trial, resulting in emotional and vindictive lit-
igants. 95 They walk in to the courthouse angry and come out even
angrier. "You don't go to family court to get justice. You go to get
answers," is a common statement made by child custody lawyers
88. See Matthew I. Fraidin, Decision-Making in Dependency Court: Heuristics, Cogni-
tive Biases, and Accountability, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 913, 972 (2013) ("[T]he use of 'form
orders' discourages reason-giving. These orders are primarily forms with check-boxes and
fill-in-the-blank spaces. Where space is allowed for explanation and reason-giving, it is very
limited.").
89. For example, the author has experienced this in Richmond JDR court.
90. See VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-153 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
91. See Leah A. Hill, Do You See What I See? Reflections on How Bias Infiltrates the
New York City Family Court-The Case of the Court Ordered Investigation, 40 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PROBS. 527, 537-38 (2007).
92. For example, family abuse protective orders, which are "civil," are issued every day
in JDR courts, but violations of the orders often result in jail time. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-60.4 (Cum. Supp. 2017); see also Child Support and Incarceration, NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-
services/child-support-and-incarceration.aspx (discussing that non-custodial parents are
regularly incarcerated for failure to pay civil child support orders).
93. See, e.g., Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People's
Courts, 22 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 473, 487 (2015) (footnotes omitted) ("[Today there
remain many variations among family courts in terms of organization and administration,
there nonetheless exists a shared institutional history and culture among family courts.
This includes a common origin and philosophy that manifest in three interrelated features:
interventionism (e.g., use of social workers and medical and mental health professionals to
conduct evaluations of litigants), informalism (e.g., simplification of procedures and forms,
and efforts to resolve disputes outside of the litigation process), and intersecting systems,
including the enduring interrelationship of criminal and civil procedures in family courts.").
94. Hill, supra note 91, at 534; see also Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of
the Best Interests of the Child Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
337, 373 (2008) (noting that the best interests of the child standard often does not give the
judge any guidance for her ruling and therefore the judge's decision-making process is "un-
bridled" and "subjective').
95. Hill, supra note 91, at 534.
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when trying to encourage potential litigants to avoid trial. 96 When
a stranger makes personal decisions for a family, no party is ever
completely happy.
Judges struggle to trust the parties involved in custody mat-
ters.97 "There is an almost knee-jerk reaction by the judges that
parents cannot be trusted to provide the court with all the infor-
mation necessary to reach the best resolution of disputes involving
children."98 Thus, judges often prefer to avoid custody cases.99
C. Best Interests of the Child Standard
States began including what are known as "best interests of the
child" ("BIC") tests in their statutes during the mid-twentieth cen-
tury to deal with complex custody disputes. 100 Virginia's statute
delineates ten factors, all subject to interpretation, and ends with
a catch-all factor under which almost anything can be consid-
ered.101
96. See Pauline Gaines, 7 Things Never to Say to Someone Going Through a High-Con-
flict Divorce, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pauline-
gaines/5-things-never-to-say-to- b 1653823.html (internal quotations omitted).
97. See Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 41, at 288.
98. Id.
99. Frederica K. Lombard, Judicial Interviewing of Children in Custody Cases: An Em-
pirical and Analytical Study, 17 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 807, 812 & n.31 (1984). A case in Ala-
bama, in which six judges wrote seven different opinions, illustrates the difficulty of custody
cases for judges. Exparte G.C., Jr., 924 So. 2d 651 (Ala. 2005). Justice Parker, in his dissent,
noted, "After considerable reflection, I have concluded that the primary cause of the Court's
varied and often conflicting opinions in this case is disagreement over foundational issues
that underlie the more visible custody issues." Id. at 674 (Parker, J., dissenting).
100. See Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54
ST. Louis U.L.J. 113, 117 & n.19 (2009). Every state now has a BIC statute. Id.
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Repl. Vol. 2016 & Cum. Supp. 2017). The statute lists
the factors as follows:
In determining best interests of a child for purposes of determining cus-
tody or visitation arrangements including any pendente lite orders pursuant
to § 20-103, the court shall consider the following:
1. The age and physical and mental condition of the child, giving due con-
sideration to the child's changing developmental needs;
2. The age and physical and mental condition of each parent;
3. The relationship existing between each parent and each child, giving due
consideration to the positive involvement with the child's life, the ability to
accurately assess and meet the emotional, intellectual and physical needs of
the child;
4. The needs of the child, giving due consideration to other important rela-
tionships of the child, including but not limited to siblings, peers and extended
family members;
5. The role that each parent has played and will play in the future, in the
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Many have written about states' BIC statutes, including Vir-
ginia's. The BIC standard has been described as
a highly indeterminate test. It is often devoid of significant legislative
guidelines and instead invites the court to explore the fullest range of
the family's prior history and philosophy of child-rearing. The courts
[become] embroiled in the sifting and winnowing of a multitude of fac-
tors and [are] called upon to exercise exceedingly broad discretion on
a case-by-case basis. At the same time this wide discretion has nearly
exempted the trial court from appellate review. Many authors have
argued cogently that the best interest standard should be revised.102
Cases often result in inherently biased judgments based on the
vague guidance of BIC statutes.10 3
upbringing and care of the child;
6. The propensity of each parent to actively support the child's contact and
relationship with the other parent, including whether a parent has unreason-
ably denied the other parent access to or visitation with the child;
7. The relative willingness and demonstrated ability of each parent to main-
tain a close and continuing relationship with the child, and the ability of each
parent to cooperate in and resolve disputes regarding matters affecting the
child;
8. The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be
of reasonable intelligence, understanding, age and experience to express such
a preference;
9. Any history of family abuse as that term is defined in § 16.1-228 or sexual
abuse. If the court finds such a history, the court may disregard the factors in
subdivision 6; and
10. Such other factors as the court deems necessary and proper to the deter-
mination.
The judge shall communicate to the parties the basis of the decision either
orally or in writing. Except in cases of consent orders for custody and visita-
tion, this communication shall set forth the judge's findings regarding the rel-
evant factors set forth in this section.
Id.
102. Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 41, at 289-90 (footnotes omitted).
103. See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 40 (2005)
("The best interests standard necessarily invites the judge to rely on his or her own values
and biases to decide the case in whatever way the judge thinks best. Even the most basic
factors are left for the judge to figure out."); June Carbone, Child Custody and the Best
Interests of Children-A Review of From Father's Property To Children's Rights: The His-
tory of Child Custody in the United States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 721, 723 (1995) (reviewing MARY
ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD
CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES (1994)) ("Even putting aside the possibility of judicial bias,
judges lack a basis on which to evaluate the best interests of a particular child in the absence
of guiding principles."). For example, Virginia's statute lists factors with no other guidance
in how to use or rank them. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Repl. Vol. 2016). Others have
also critiqued the factor-based BIC approach. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments:
Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987); Linda Jellum, Parents
Know Best: Revising Our Approach to Parental Custody Agreements, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 615
(2004); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975).
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D. Prevalence of GALs
Virginia, like other states, uses GALs as a way to deal with the
challenges of custody cases. 104 However, the use of GALs is contro-
versial;105 people do not agree about the role GALs should play or
how they should advocate.106
Virginia statutory law states that "discreet and competent attor-
neys-at-law may be appointed" as GALs by the court.107 To become
a GAL in Virginia, an attorney must complete a seven-hour contin-
uing legal education course and demonstrate she is familiar with
the court system and has experience in juvenile law by either (1)
shadowing one qualified GAL in two cases involving children in the
JDR court or (2) participating as counsel in at least four cases, in-
cluding traffic cases, in JDR court.108 Then, to get on a particular
JDR court's "list" for appointments, the attorney must make her-
self known to JDR judges and clerks,109 agree to accept assign-
ments, do a satisfactory job, and continue to make herself available
104. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2017); see also Richard
Ducote, Guardians Ad Litem in Private Custody Litigation: The Case for Abolition, 3 LOY.
J. PUB. INT. L. 106, 109-12 (2002) (discussing the history and development of the use of
GALs across the country).
105. See, e.g., Ducote, supra note 104, at 110-11; Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note
41, at 292-94; Martin Guggenheim, The Right to Be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections
on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U.L. REV. 76, 77 (1984).
106. See, e.g., JEAN K. PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE
PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 40-41 (3d ed. 2007) ('q had expected to
find a discrete number of prevailing models on representing children and thought that I
might be able to present sets of minority and majority views on how the role had spontane-
ously evolved in the different states as a result of the sudden requirement of guardians ad
litem in CAPTA. In the end we could find no trends; not even two states matched in theory
and practice."); Barbara A. Atwood, Representing Children Who Can't or Won't Direct Coun-
sel: Best Interests Lawyering or No Lawyer at All?, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 386-403 (2011);
Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It Is the "Right" Thing To Do, 27 PACE
L. REV. 869, 876-85 (2007).
107. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(F) (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2017).
108. See OFFICE OF THE EXEC. SEC'Y, SUPREME COURT OF VA., STANDARDS TO GOVERN
THE APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS AD LITEM PURSUANT TO § 16.1-266, CODE OF VIRGINIA 1
(2015), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadminlaoc/cip/programs/gal/children/gal-standa
rds children.pdf.
109. In the author's experience, in some courts, like courts in Richmond, judges conduct
a group interview of candidates.
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and accept assignments. 110 The more a GAL takes on appoint-
ments, "the more likely that the trial court will rely on him [or her]
as if he [or she] were an expert.""
In Virginia, GALs are more likely to be appointed for poor and
pro se litigants. In contested custody cases, the court may automat-
ically appoint a GAL unless "each of the parents or other persons
claiming a right to custody is represented by counsel." 112 If both
interested parties are represented, the court may appoint a GAL
only if it finds the child's best interests were "not otherwise ade-
quately represented."113 This means that parties who can afford
counsel are given an extra level of judicial review to determine if a
GAL is necessary, 114 but pro se litigants are routinely forced to
work with GALs because by statute judges can automatically ap-
point them when the parties are not represented.1 15 In fact, in cer-
tain venues in Virginia with low income populations, GALs are ap-
pointed in almost every custody case.116
The Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia require GALs to in-
vestigate and recommend to the court at trial what should be done
to protect the best interests of the child. 17 However, GALs are not
considered witnesses, their oral reports are not testimony, and
therefore nothing they say can be cross-examined.1 1 8 In addition,
sometimes they submit written reports prior to a hearing, which
110. This is the author's experience of "getting on the list" as a court appointed attorney
in Virginia and has been reported by the author's colleagues in many other states.
111. Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 41, at 276-77.
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(F) (2005) (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2017).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Under Virginia law indigent parties in JDR court are entitled to have counsel ap-
pointed only in cases brought by the state. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(D)(2)-(3) (Repl.
Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2017). However, there may also be persons who proceed pro se
because they do not meet the indigence threshold, but are nonetheless unable to afford pri-
vate counsel. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-159 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2017); see also
supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (discussing how JDR litigants are frequently poor
and pro se).
116. This is consistent with the author's experience, especially in the City of Richmond'
JDR Court.
117. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 8:6. (Repl. Vol. 2017).
118. OFFICE OF THE EXEc. SEC'Y, SUPREME COURT OF VA., STANDARDS TO GOVERN THE
PERFORMANCE OF GUARDIANS AD LITEM FOR CHILDREN S-1 (2003), http://www.courts.state.
va.us/courtadminlaoc/cip/programs/gal/children/gal performance-standards-children.pdf
("The GAL acts as an attorney and not a witness, which means that he or she should not be
cross-examined and, more importantly, should not testify.").
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are automatically admitted in to the record. 119 Because formal dis-
covery is not guaranteed in JDR courts, 120 GALs are also permitted
by the court to wait to give their recommendation until the conclu-
sion of the trial, after they have heard all of the "evidence."1 2 1 This
makes it even more difficult for parents' attorneys to prepare to
respond to the GAL's recommendation.
GALs basically become court employees with the autonomy to
investigate families. The supreme court approves of this role:
It is the guardian ad litem who retains the ultimate responsibility and
accountability to the court in carrying out his or her role in the man-
ner required by the court, as well as the applicable statutory and ju-
dicial mandates . ... [W]e find no error in the court's order directing
[parents] to permit the guardian ad litem and a member of his staff to
visit their homes on an unannounced or announced basis, for the pur-
poses stated in the court's order. 122
Although debating the correct use of GALs is beyond the scope
of this article, it is important to note that statutory and case law
clearly permit GALs to make judgments for families every day in
the courtroom. 123 So it is not surprising that judges ask GALs to
make post-decretal decisions about them as well.
119. Id. at S-9-S-10 (2003), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadminlaoc/cip/programs
/gal/children/gal performance standards children.pdf.
120. See R. 8:15 (Repl. Vol. 2017); see also Discovery in Civil Cases in Virginia's Juvenile
& Domestic Relations Court, NAT'L L. REV. (Mar. 17, 2014), https://www.natlawreview.com
/article/discovery-civil-cases-virginia-s-juvenile-domestic-relations-court ("Leave of court is
required in order for one party to propound discovery upon another party, and a court must
find good cause before allowing the discovery or inspection of evidence. It is not permissible
for an attorney to simply propound discovery upon the other side as would occur in Circuit
Court civil litigation.").
121. Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 41, at 286.
122. See Ferguson v. Grubb, 39 Va. App. 549, 561, 574 S.E.2d 769, 775 (2003).
123. See Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 41, at 270.
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IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH DELEGATION
A. Due Process
The Supreme Court has long held that parenting is a fundamen-
tal right,124 though the state may intervene under the doctrine of
parens patriae or "police power" to protect the interests of a child.125
This liberty right has evolved to encompass a range of activities.
One of the first parental activities analyzed by the Court was the
right of parents to make fundamental decisions about the educa-
tion of their children in Meyer v. Nebraska.126 The Meyer Court
characterized this right as a liberty right under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.127 While refraining from de-
fining what, exactly, the liberty right is, the Court held that it at
least includes the right to "establish a home and bring up chil-
dren." 2 8 The Court concluded that a state statute that interferes
with this right cannot be "arbitrary and without reasonable rela-
tion" to the state's powers.1 2 9
The Court affirmed this liberty right in Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, where an Oregon law mandating parents to send their young
children to public schools "unreasonably interfere[d] with the lib-
erty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and educa-
tion of children under their control." 130 The Court instructed that
"[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." 1 3 1
The Court found that the Oregon law had "no reasonable relation
to some purpose within the competency of the State." 1 32
124. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ('The fundamental liberty inter-
est of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evapo-
rate simply because they have not been model parents."); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
658 (1972) ("[A]1 Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness
before their children are removed from their custody.").
125. See Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 (1986).
126. 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
127. Id. at 399.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 403.
130. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).




In these early cases, the Court carved out the rights to establish
a home, to bring up children, and to control their education. These
rights were afforded protection from government interference
without a showing of some reasonable relation to the state's police
powers. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court recognized the sub-
stantive rights of parents and affirmed the state's power to
properly intervene to protect youths from the dangers of "emo-
tional excitement and psychological or physical injury."1 33
This still left open the question: Is the liberty right analogous to
a property right or is it something more? In May v. Anderson, de-
cided in 1953, this fundamental right was declared more than a
property right in that a state must obtain personal jurisdiction be-
fore deciding any parental rights.1 34 In Armstrong v. Manzo, the
Court held that due process requires notice to a biological parent
before an adoption can take place. 135
Having established procedural due process, the Court finally
wrestled more deeply with substantive due process. In 1972, in
Stanley v. Illinois, the Court restated that the rights to create and
raise a family are "essential" and should be free from technical re-
straints such as a legal definition based on a marriage ceremony. 136
The Court held that Stanley, an unmarried father, because of the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, was entitled to a hear-
ing on his parental fitness before his children could be taken away
from him. 137 While Stanley's interests were cognizable and sub-
stantial, the state's interest in the children was "de minimis" with-
out a finding that Stanley was unfit. 138 This was reiterated in
Quillion v. Walcott, where the Court held that the Due Process
Clause "would be offended '[i]f a State were to attempt to force the
breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and
their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole
133. 321 U.S. 158, 166, 170 (1944).
134. 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953) (holding that a custody order is not entitled to full faith
and credit if the state in which the order originated did not have personal jurisdiction).
However, May v. Anderson was superseded by the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act and
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. See Brown v. Brown, 847 S.W.2d 496, 499
(Tenn. 1993).
135. 380 U.S. 545, 551-52 (1965).
136. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923)) ("[The
law [has not] refused to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage
ceremony.").
137. Id. at 658.
138. Id. at 657-58.
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reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best inter-
est."'
1 3 9
The Constitution today requires due process before a court can
use its parens patraie power to make decisions on behalf of a parent
regarding his child's best interest. When non-judicial authorities,
outside of the courtroom, make decisions regarding the fundamen-
tal rights of parents, there is, by definition, no due process.
B. Physical Liberty
The Stanley Court did not imagine that actual physical liberty
would be implicated when it invoked a due process analysis for pa-
rental rights. 140 But in the implementation of private custody or-
ders, physical liberty is also at stake. Private custody orders are
only enforceable by one party filing a civil show cause motion for
contempt of court against the other party.1 41 Civil show causes in
Virginia custody cases (for example, for missing one visit) carry a
potential penalty of incarceration. 1 4 2 Parties (usually pro se) file
show cause motions every day in JDR courts, much to the chagrin
of judges, who do not want to be involved with every missed visit
or other co-parenting impasse.143
139. 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring) (alterations in original) (quoting
Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977)).
140. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658. Here, the Court explains that the due process issue is
one of avoiding dismemberment of a family unit, which does not involve a physical restraint
of liberty. Id.
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-292(A) (Cum. Supp. 2017). This contrasts with enforcement
of child welfare matters, where the government itself intervenes with the family, often re-
moving the children from their parents. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1502 (Repl. Vol. 2017). In
these matters, by statute, the court can enforce orders through the Child-Protective Services
Unit. Id. The court can also choose to not return the children to the parents if they do not
comply with orders.
142. Id. § 6.1-292 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
If civil contempt is sought for a violation of a court order § 16.1-292 allows for
a disposition that might include incarceration until the contempt is purged (for
example the support arrearage or a portion of it is paid or the child returned
to the lawful custodian, or as ordered in each particular case). In this court the
time that a person can be held in jail cannot exceed 12 months on a finding of
guilt of contempt.
Lynchburg Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court: Show Cause Contempt-Custody,
Visitation, Support, VA.'S JUD. Sys., http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/jdr/Lynchburg
/show.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2017).
143. The author has "defended" against approximately fifty show cause motions and rep-
resented clients "prosecuting" approximately twenty-five show cause motions (usually after




When the state acts as parens patriae in a custody matter, state
law mandates it adhere to a BIC standard, as discussed. 144 Vir-
ginia's custody statutes are clear that only judges have the author-
ity to make such a best interest determination. 14 5 Therefore, when
a judge delegates any decision regarding best interests, it violates
the strict letter of the law.
D. Therapist Perspective
Lastly, it is important to note, though beyond the scope of this
article, that court-involved therapists universally agree that those
therapists should not be making judicial decisions. 14 6 There are en-
tire peer-reviewed journal volumes in the discipline of child cus-
tody dedicated to helping therapeutic professionals navigate court
appointments in child custody cases.1 47 Although viewpoints vary
on the precise boundaries, the most salient theme is that thera-
pists must leave best interest judgments to judges and the judicial
process. 148 Doing otherwise can actually run afoul of professional
guidelines and get the therapist into trouble.
only when all other efforts to get the other party to comply with the order have been ex-
hausted. JDR and circuit court judges are adverse to hearing show cause motions, but clerks'
offices must allow parties to file if any aspect of a custody order is violated. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-278.16 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
144. See id. § 20-124.3 (Repl. Vol. 2016 & Supp. 2017).
145. See id. § 20-124.2 (Repl. Vol. 2016 & Supp. 2017).
A. In any case in which custody or visitation of minor children is at issue,
whether in a circuit or district court, the court shall provide prompt adjudica-
tion, upon due consideration of all the facts, of custody and visitation arrange-
ments, including support and maintenance for the children, prior to other con-
siderations arising in the matter . . . . The procedures for determining custody
and visitation arrangements shall insofar as practical, and consistent with the
ends of justice, preserve the dignity and resources of family members ....
B. In determining custody, the court shall give primary consideration to the
best interests of the child.
Id.
146. See, e.g., AsS'N OF FAMILY & CONCILIATION COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR COURT
INVOLVED THERAPY 29 (2010) (recommending that court-involved therapists not offer opin-
ions on "psycho-legal issues").
147. See Matthew J. Sullivan & Lyn R. Greenberg, Introduction to the Special Issue on
Court Involved Therapy, 9 J. CHILD CUSTODY 1, 1 (2012).
148. See, e.g., Lyn R. Greenberg et al., Keeping the Development Frame: Child-Centered
Conjoint Therapy, 9 J. CHILD CUSTODY 39, 47 (2012).
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In an atmosphere of limited resources, it is often tempting to vest the
therapist with the power to make recommendations on psycho-legal
issues, such as the best schedule .... This can be fatal to the treat-
ment process, and the therapist may be in jeopardy of licensing board
actions and ethical complaints. 149
The therapist should be "able to say, '[t]he judge decided; I'm just
here to make it work."'15 0
V. OTHER STATES





York, 151 Vermont, 152 North Dakota, 153 Florida, 154 Georgia, 155 Mary-
land, 15 6 California, 157 Nebraska, 15 8 North Carolina, 159 South Caro-
lina, 160 and Colorado161 have said that delegation of judicial author-
ity in custody cases is unlawful. By the author's count of the cases
151. See In re Alisia M. 973 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (finding that there
was an improper delegation of the court's authority because the order made the recommen-
dation of a therapist a prerequisite for any visitation); Sloand v. Sloand, 16 N.Y.S.2d 603,
606 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (holding that the Family Court improperly delegated the court's
authority to the child's therapist "regarding the expansion or reduction of the mother's ac-
cess to the child"); Henderson v. Henderson, 779 N.Y.S.2d 282, 283 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
(finding that the Family Court "impermissibly delegated its authority to determine the best
interests of the child" when "directing that the daughter's mental health counselor structure
the terms of the father's visitation'); Fisk v. Fisk, 710 N.Y.S.2d 473, 475-76 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000) (finding that the Family Court "improperly delegated its authority to a counselor to
determine the best interests of the children in the structure of supervised visitation"); Mil-
lett v. Millett, 703 N.Y.S.2d 596, 598 (2000) (finding that although the Family Court's de-
termination that visitation be supervised was also supported by the record, the court imper-
missibly delegated its authority by ordering the therapist to arrange visitation); Gadomski
v. Gadomski, 681 N.Y.S.2d 374 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding it was improper delegation
for the family counselor to determine what length of visitation would be in the best interest
of the children).
152. See DeSantis v. Pegues, 35 A.3d 152, 160 (Vt. 2011) (finding that the court cannot
precondition the father's future visitation on working collaboratively with a thera-
pist); Fenoff v. Fenoff, 578 A.2d 119, 121 (Vt. 1990) (implying that delegating complete au-
thority to the counselor to determine if visitation should occur at all is an improper delega-
tion of judicial authority, but holding that did not occur in this case when the court allowed
the counselor to choose the start date for visitation); Cameron v. Cameron, 398 A.2d 294,
296 (Vt. 1979) (holding that the court did a sufficient independent evaluation of the facts
without improperly delegating authority to the Department of Social Welfare to find facts
and make decisions).
153. See Paulson v. Paulson, 694 N.W.2d 681, 691 (N.D. 2005) ("[T]he trial court imper-
missibly delegated its authority, under the circumstances, by allowing [the therapist] to set
the visitation schedule, carte blanche.").
154. See Larocka v. Larocka, 43 So. 3d 911, 913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (reversing "the
part of the final judgment that delegates that responsibility to a counselor and remand[ing]
this case to the trial court so it can comply with its judicial responsibility [to establish a
visitation schedule]"); Roski v. Roski, 730 So. 2d 413, 414 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (caution-
ing "trial judges against abdicating their decision-making responsibility to a guardian ad
litem"); Scaringe v. Herrick, 711 So. 2d 204, 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Blue, J., concur-
ring) (encouraging trial judges "remain vigilant that they not abdicate their fact-finding and
decisional responsibilities to a guardian ad litem").
155. See Wrightson v. Wrightson, 467 S.E.2d 578, 581 (Ga. 1996) (holding that the trial
court's responsibility for making the custody and visitation decision "cannot be delegated to
another, no matter the degree of the delegatee's expertise or familiarity with the case').
156. See In re Mark M., 782 A.2d 332, 342 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) ("mhe trial court's
order constituted an improper delegation of judicial authority to the child's therapist and
thus was legally incorrect."); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 458 A.2d 1257, 1261 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1983) (finding that the "denial of visitation until such visitation is recommended by the
child's physician and then only upon such terms, guidelines and at such places as the phy-
sician may recommend constitutes an improper delegation of judicial responsibility to the
physician").
157. In re Donnovan J., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714, 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that
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just discussed, there are at least twenty-five that recognize as
such. These state courts clearly state that delegation of judicial au-
thority is either unconstitutional, contrary 'to state law, or both.
Over and over again, the courts are clear. For example,
In its final order, Family Court appears to have improperly delegated
to the child's therapist the court's authority regarding the expansion
or reduction of the mother's access to the child. Any such modification
which is not agreed to by the parties shall be made only by the court
on the formal application of either parent or the Law Guardian. That
aspect of Family Court's order should be reversed. 162
the juvenile court improperly delegated to a therapist the determination of whether visita-
tion is appropriate); De Guere v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 447 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997) ('The California Constitution, article VI, section 22, prohibits the delegation
of judicial power except for the performance of subordinate judicial duties."); In re Moriah
T., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 705, 706-07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a juvenile court may
delegate to a county social worker the responsibility to manage details of visitation such as
the time, place, and manner thereof, but it may not delegate absolute discretion to deter-
mine whether any visitation occurs); In re Jennifer G., 270 Cal. Rptr. 326, 326-27 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (finding that "the trial court improperly delegated the power to determine visit-
ation" to a social services department); In re Marriage of Matthews, 161 Cal. Rptr. 879, 882
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980) ("[T]hat provision authorizing [the family counselor] to alter the visita-
tion schedule in any way she deemed reasonable and necessary constituted an improper
delegation of judicial power to a subordinate court attach.").
158. Deacon v. Deacon, 297 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Neb. 1980) ("[T]hat portion of the trial
court's order placing in a psychologist the authority to effectively determine visitation, and
to control the extent and time of such visitation, is not the intent of the law and is an un-
lawful delegation of the trial court's duty. Such delegation could result in the denial of
proper visitation rights of the noncustodial parent.").
159. Peters v. Pennington, 707 S.E.2d 724, 738 (N.C. 2011) (acknowledging that trial
courts "should hesitate in delegating decision-making authority" but affirming the trial
court's decision to vest neutral third parties with such authority).
160. Stefan v. Stefan, 465 S.E.2d 734, 736 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing the "portion of
the family court order which required the husband to attend sessions with a parenting pro-
fessional and to undergo additional referrals in the parenting professional's discretion").
161. In re Marriage of McNamara, 962 P.2d 330, 334-35 (Colo. App. 1998) (finding that
it is an improper delegation of authority for the court to grant an appointed GAL the power
to modify the parenting time schedule without having the parties return to court); In re
Marriage of Elmer, 936 P.2d 617, 620 (Colo. App. 1997) (stating that the trial court's order
temporarily postponing the father's rights to overnight visitation of his daughter on advice
of the child's psychiatrist improperly delegated the court's authority).
162. Sloand v. Sloand, 816 N.Y.S.2d 603, 606 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); see, e.g., In re Do-
novan J., 68 Cal. Reptr. 2d 714, 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) ("Under this order, the therapists,
not the court, have unlimited discretion to decide whether visitation is appropriate. That is
an improper delegation of judicial power."); In re marriage of McNamara, 962 P.2d 220, 334-
35 (Colo. App. 1998) ("[The statutory scheme requires the trial court itself to make decisions
regarding parenting time, and it may not delegate this decisional function to third parties.
Hence, we conclude that this delegation of authority [to a GAL] to modify parenting time
was error.") (emphasis added); In re marriage of Elmer, 936 P.2d 617, 621 (Colo. App. 1997)
("We know of no authority that would authorize the trial court to defer indefinitely the de-
cision for exercise of overnight visitation and to delegate that decision to the child's psychi-
atrist."); Roski v. Roski, 730 So.2d 413, 414 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) ("[W]e have previously
cautioned trial judges against abdicating their decision-making responsibility to a guardian
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It is notable that many of these states have banned delegation
for years-some cases go back as far as 1980.163 Moreover, these
high courts repeatedly rule as such whenever a trial judge tries to
delegate authority and the order makes its way to appellate
level. 164
Why has Virginia been behind the ball? As discussed throughout
this article, Virginia has a trial system for custody cases that
makes it uniquely susceptible to cultural practices that never get
appealed. In other words, it is easy for trial court judges to keep
ordering something over and over again, with or without even re-
alizing it is not lawful. This is not to lay blame on trial court judges
per se; as discussed, they are faced with some of the most difficult
decisions they will ever make in private custody cases, and they
have few reliable sources of information. So even if a judge has a
suspicion that she may be over-delegating, in the absence of clear
direction from the court of appeals, it is understandable why she
tends to do so.
Moreover, JDR judges should not be wholly blamed for this phe-
nomenon because it is a product of Virginia's bizarre court system.
As discussed, Virginia's JDR courts are not courts of record.1 65 Cus-
tody litigants are statutorily entitled to two trials.166 Parents who
are not married must go to JDR court first to adjudicate their cus-
tody disputes. 167 Then, they can appeal them de novo to circuit
court.1 68 Parents who are married can file their custody petitions
concurrently with their divorce petitions, 169 but in reality, most
ad litem .... We strongly encourage trial judges to jealously guard the court's authority in
such matters."); Gadomski v. Gadomski, 681 N.Y.S.2d 374, 376 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) ("It is
now well settled that ... a court [cannot] delegate (as was done here) to a mental health
professional its authority to resolve these issues in the best interests of the children.").
163. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Matthews, 161 Cal. Rptr. 879, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding a court order delegating authority to unilaterally modify a visitation schedule was
improper).
164. Based on the author's experience.
165. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-226 to -361 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2017) (establish-
ing the JDR courts as "courts not of record").
166. See id. § 16.1-241(A) (Cum. Supp. 2017) (declaring that JDR courts have original
jurisdiction over custody matters); id. § 16.1-296(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2017)
(explaining that after JDR court the parties may appeal the custody order).
167. See id. § 16.1-241 (Cum. Supp. 2017) (establishing exclusive original jurisdiction for
JDR courts over issues relating to the custody of children).
168. Id. § 16.1-296(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2017).
169. Id. § 20-107.2 (Repl. Vol. 2016 & Supp. 2017).
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parents begin in JDR court because of the one-year separation pe-
riod that is required before filing for a divorce. 170 So, almost all cus-
tody litigants have to go through two expensive and emotionally
draining steps before review on matters of law.
Other states have courts "not of record."171 Across the country,
as in Virginia, these courts proceed according to statutory jurisdic-
tion and are considered inferior courts. 17 2 But other states' inferior
courts do not hear matters regarding child custody. Everywhere
else in this country, private child custody matters are given one
trial in a court of record1 73 whose judgments are "as conclusive on
all the world as the judgment of [the Supreme Court] would be. It
is as conclusive on [the Supreme Court] as it is on other courts. It
puts an end to inquiry concerning the fact by deciding it."174 This
makes it far more likely that questionable trial court orders will be
reviewed as matters of law in other states.
CONCLUSION
We are at a watershed moment for custody law in Virginia. We
can go in the direction of other states and begin chipping away at
the inveterate, but unlawful, practice of delegating judicial author-
ity in private child custody cases. Or not. Delegation orders will
most certainly continue unless family lawyers in Virginia make a
concerted effort to educate trial level judges. We lawyers must also
be mindful of the concept of delegation when arguing for clients
170. See id. § 20-91(A)(9) (Repl. Vol. 2016 & Supp. 2017).
171. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 2 (Consol. 2017).
172. Compare Walker v. Dep't Pub. Welfare, 223 Va. 557, 562, 290 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1982)
("The jurisdiction, practice, and procedure of the juvenile and domestic relations district
courts are entirely statutory .... ), with People ex rel. Walsh v. Ashworth, 56 N.Y.S.2d 791,
793 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945) ('"Inferior courts not of record do not possess [a particular] power,
unless conferred by statute' . . . ; inferior courts are established by the Legislature and are
essentially statutory courts and hence as a general rule possess and may exercise only such
powers as are expressly conferred upon them.") (citation omitted); Nobles v. Piollet, 16 Pa.
Super. 386, 389 (1901) ("[Wle think it safe to assume that the framers of the constitution
had in contemplation the courts not of record directed to be established in Philadelphia and
similar inferior courts not of record that might be established under the power reserved to
the legislature .... ).
173. In conducting research for this article, the author called at least one court in every
single state in the country and asked how their custody matters were heard. Although some
courts hear custody matters at a district level, no states have de novo trials for every single
custody case by right, as in Virginia.
174. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 254 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03 (1830)).
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and reviewing orders. Even if litigants are rarely able to file ap-
peals at the appellate or even de novo level, the number of delega-
tion orders issued by the trial courts can gradually decrease. But
this process is in the hands of a relatively small community of do-
mestic relations lawyers and GALs who toil in the JDR and circuit
courthouses of Virginia every day.

